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In the last 20 years there has been a 
great upsurge of interest, amongst British 
and American legal scholars, in the 
construction of general theories of 
private law. The purpose of this note is 
simply to draw this development to the 
attention of a wider legal community.
LOOKING AT PRIVATE LAW
Theories of private law attempt a 
systematic articulation of the values and 
conceptions of justice underpinning the 
doctrines of private law. The objectives of 
such articulation are threefold:
  a philosophical extension of 
traditional concerns for doctrinal 
systematisation;
  the utilisation of the theory in the 
interpretation and development of 
the law; and
  a reflective understanding of the 
relationship between the peculiar 
concerns of private law (seemingly 
focused upon justice between 
individual litigants) and the wider 
distributive or aggregative policies 
which characterise the public or 
regulatory aspects of law.
One of the major watersheds within 
the debate divides two broad schools of 
thought. On the one hand are those who
o
view private law as an instrument of 
policy, differing from public law in form 
and technique but not in substance and 
goal (exponents of law-and-economics 
fall, for the most part, into this camp). 
On the other hand are theorists who 
emphasise the distinctive values and 
concerns of private law, and its relative 
autonomy from the broader social policy 
objectives of public law.
COMMON LAW STRUCTURE
The growth of this literature in 
common law jurisdictions is somewhat 
surprising, since it seems to conflict with 
traditional perceptions of the common 
law as essentially pragmatic and 
a theoretical. Still more surprising is the 
fact that some influential general theories 
of private law resurrect versions of 
Kantian formalism that played a central
role in nineteenth century German legal 
scholarship, and that formed a principal 
focus for the attacks of twentieth century 
legal scholars such as Oliver Wendell 
Holmes. Such resurrections may be 
found in, for example, Ernest Weinribb's 
book, The Idea of Private Law (Harvard, 
1995) and in Richard Wright's article, 
'Right Justice and Tort Law' in David G
o J
Owen's collection Philosophical 
Foundations of Tort Law (Clarendon Press, 
1995). How then is the rise of this 
theoretical literature to be explained?
It is, of course, true that the 
conventional portrait of the common law 
as devoid of theory has its limitations. 
Modern lawyers work for the most part 
within categories that wrere invented by 
the great Victorian treatise writers. The 
modern common law is not the mass of 
disorderly erudition that was familiar to 
Coke, but is structured by a limited 
number of fairly abstract ideas and 
categorial distinctions: contract and tort; 
duty and negligence; breach and
J O O '
causation; and so forth. However, the 
theoretical enterprise that was implicit in 
the construction of such categories was 
in large part a matter of marshalling and 
giving precision to ideas drawn from the 
our ordinary moral discourse. Indeed, it 
was in part the familiarity of the basic 
ideas that gave them a seeminglv self-
o to j
explanatory quality, and made them 
appear a suitable basis for the 
rationalisation of the common law's 
generous multiplicity. The enterprise in 
which writers such as Pollack and Anson 
engaged was unquestionably a theoretical 
engagement and not just a task of
o o >
systematic commentary; but it did not 
require (as do the modern debates) a 
full-blooded engagement with political or
o o 1
economic theory.
WHY THEORIES ARISE
Many diverse explanations could be 
offered for the growing interest in
o o
theoretically sophisticated approaches to 
private law. In this brief note, I will 
mention only one such explanation: the 
erosion of familiar moral and social 
baselines for legal thought.
In the first place, and most obviously, a 
sceptical and pluralistic age renders 
problematic the invocation of moral 
values in adjudication: for such values 
might be said to be simply those of the 
judge, and to possess no further or 
deeper legitimacy. Within the common 
law, appeals to what is 'fair' and 
'reasonable' play an important and 
integral part in most aspects of 
adjudication (the task of distinguishing 
cases, for example, is inseparable from 
the question of which distinctions would 
be fair and reasonable as grounds for 
differential treatment).
Secondly, and somewhat less obviously, 
judgments of causal responsibility7 can be 
shown to depend upon the assumption of 
a taken-for-granted background against 
which the cause operates as an 
intervention on a stage already set (such 
dependence was ably demonstrated by- 
Hart and Honore in their classic work 
Causation in the Law (Oxford, 1985). 
Increasing social fluidity' and an 
awareness of the plasticity of human 
arrangements seems to render the 
identification of such causal baselines 
increasingly1 problematic.
o * 1
It is therefore significant that by far the 
most influential school of theoretical 
reflection upon private law builds directly 
upon these twin problems of moral 
pluralism and causal indeterminacy. I 
refer, of course, to the chief 
manifestations of the law-and-economics 
movement which received its main 
impetus from a single brilliant article, 
'The Problem of Social Cost' by Robert 
Coase, Journal of Law and Economics 1960, 
volume 3 page 1.
LAW AND ECONOMICS
Whatever the precise criterion of 
efficiency favoured by an economic 
approach to the law, the criterion will 
work from some conception of revealed 
preference. The attraction of this for a 
fundamentally prescriptive theory is that 
it endeavours to accommodate the moral 
pluralism of modern society by treating 
all such diverse moral judgments as mere 
preferences, thereby giving them a role
within the aims of the theory, but 
requiring no choice between conflicting 
moral demands. One could, of course, 
point out that this does not overcome the 
philosophical problem of grounding a set 
of prescriptions, since the injunction to 
maximise overall preference-attainment 
is simply another prescription on a par 
with those being treated by the theory as 
mere preferences. Nevertheless, the 
economic approach appears on the face 
of things to embody a powerful 
conception of legitimacy, whereby 
outcomes will be shaped by the 
distribution of preferences across the 
population.
Similarly, the economic approach 
attaches no importance to the 
conventional causal judgments studied by 
Hart and Honore, treating only 'but for' 
causation as raising a genuine causal
o o
issue. This 'causal minimalism', as Hart 
and Honore style it, flows from the 
aggregative approach of the economist, 
wherein every legal dispute involves a 
conflict about the allocation of resources, 
rather than a dispute about responsibility. 
Hence the economic approach seeks to 
avoid the seeming arbitrariness of the 
need to identify taken-for-granted 
baselines as a foundation for judgments 
of causal responsibility.
The most striking feature of law-and-
o
economics to the outside observer, 
however, is its radical departure from the 
ordinary language and conceptual 
structures of private law. Traditional legal 
concepts such as those of fault, 
responsibility, and causation have focused 
upon the rights and wrongs of past 
transactions between the plaintiff and
defendant. All such backward-looking 
conceptions are abandoned by the 
economic approach, or are treated as 
entirely secondary to forward-looking 
aggregative questions of economic 
efficiency. This abandonment of 
traditional legal ideas has been the 
principal feature of economic analysis 
provoking (by negative reaction) the 
emergence of rival, non-economic, 
theories of private law.
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
Economic theories of law attach little 
importance to the distinction between 
private and public law: the forms of 
private law are regarded as specific 
instrumentalities, differing from those of
o
public law, but to be justified ultimately 
by reference to their consequences. By 
contrast, some of the currently influential 
non-economic theories attach great 
importance to the distinction: indeed, 
they take the demarcation of a distinct 
realm of private law as central to their 
whole enterprise. Private law is conceived 
of as a body of principles regulating 
justice between individual citizens and 
embodying a conception of corrective 
justice; while public law is regarded as an 
implementation of the state's distributive 
and aggregative projects. Consequently, it 
is suggested, political and moral 
disagreements find expression in public 
law, while private law is the manifestation 
of an apolitical and relatively uncontested 
conception of human agency and 
responsibility. In this way the theories 
seek to overcome the problem of moral 
pluralism.
The problem of causal indeterminacy
Criminal Law
has been less explicitly addressed by non- 
economic theorists, and this omission 
poses some serious problems. For 
example, many such theorists analyse 
private law in terms of a model of 
corrective justice drawn from Aristotle. 
Their general concern is to present 
corrective justice as more than the simple 
restoration of a distributively just 
situation upset by a wrong of some sort: 
corrective justice, it is suggested, has a 
status that is autonomous and 
independent of distributive justice. 
Corrective justice expresses certain 
conceptions of agency and responsibility 
that are neutral between distributive 
schemes. Such theorists might reasonably 
point out that the common sense 
judgments of causal responsibility 
analysed by Hart and Honore are, as the
DEMARCATION OF PRIVATE LAW
Private law is conceived ot as a body of 
principles regulating justice between 
individual citizens and embodying a 
conception of corrective justice; while public 
law is regarded as an implementation of the 
state's distributive and aggregative projects.
authors themselves explain, fundamental 
to our whole notion of human identity 
and agency. Specific problems arising 
from our awareness of the plasticity of 
human arrangements should not, 
therefore, be too lightly confused with a 
fundamental erosion of notions of causal 
responsibility. ©
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Criminal Procedure & Investigations Bill — for better or for worse?
by Sheilagh Davies
The Criminal Justice Act 1987 (CJA 
1987) hailed a new era. Obligations 
were imposed on prosecution and 
defence to collaborate at an early stageJ o
to identify issues, serve documents, 
prepare schedules and deal with points 
of law. The preparatory hearing was 
introduced. The intention was better 
case management, to smooth the path 
towards the presentation of trial and 
make the system generally more 
efficient.
INCREASE IN APPEALS
As an idea, this was a good one but its 
operation was at variance with what 
Parliament intended. The Act made 
provision that the party who lost on a 
particular point at a preparatory hearing 
could take that point on appeal. This 
caused a rush of applications to the Court 
of Appeal with counsel doubtless feeling 
that they had to take the point so as not 
to be disadvantaged later. In a number of
decisions the court ruled that the legal 
arguments did not form part of the 
preparatory hearing. Arguably, the Court 
of Appeal was looking for clarification, 
but the reality is that there have been a 
number of inconsistent decisions that 
have defeated Parliament's intention for 
smoother case management. If the Court 
of Appeal was looking for an 
administrative way of lowering theJ o
number of appeals they had to force the 
ball back into the court of the Executive.
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